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14.1 Introduction
In addition to altering fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies in
response to the surge in intern~tio~al capital inflows in the early 199~s,
policy makers in many countnes III ASIa, Eastern Europe, and Latin
America have resorted to measures to control capital inflows.! The types
of measures used have varied widely across countries; in some ~ases ~he
capital control took the form of a tax on capi~al inflo,:s (BrazIl, ChIl~,
Colombia, and, more recently, Thailand), and III other Illstances quanti-
tative restrictions were used (Czech Republic and Malaysia). In a num-
ber of countries (Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand), the contro~s
came in the form of "prudential measures" directed at the dom~sti.c
financial sector measures to curb banks' offshore borrowing or 11l~llt
their foreign e~change exposure are examples of this type of polIcy
response. Usually, these "sand-in-the-,:"heels" polici~s have ta~get:~
short-term capital flows, which are perceIved to be relatively volatd~ a
destabilizing. Not surprisingly, there is a renewed interest and.consId~r-
able debate in academic and policy circles regarding the relative merIts
and effectiveness of such policies. ft n
Recent policies aimed at curbing capital inflows have most 0 e
been thought of as "temporary" measures, either because they hav~
been explicitly announced as such (Malaysia in early ~994), ar~ uS~e
countercyclically - that is, restrictions and taxes are tighte~ed I~ :re
heavy inflow phase of the cycle and relaxed as these subSIde 0 e
reversed (Brazil and Colombia) - or simply are thought to beco
Il1
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1 Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993, 1994).
ineffective after a while.2 Hence, when analyzing the effects of these
policies in a theoretical framework, two of their key features must be
kept in mind - their temporariness (in the sense that controls are only in
place or are binding during a finite horizon) and their asymmetry (in
that, unlike a Tobin tax which is applied to all transactions, these policies
target inflows).3
The aims of this chapter are twofold. First, we analyze the
macroeconomic effects of a temporary tax on capital inflows in the
context of a standard, representative-agent, intertemporal model. The
temporariness of controls on inflows is by government design rather than
eventual evasion. The emphasis of the analysis is on tracing the effects of
this policy on key variables, such as consumption, the real exchange rate,
the current account, and capital flows. Second, we review the stylized
facts of the periods leading up to and following the imposition of
capital controls in several countries in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin
America, including Brazil, the Czech Republic, Chile, Colombia, and
Malaysia. The aim is to assess to what extent these measures were able to
achieve their intended goals of influencing the level and composition of
capital flows - specifically, whether they were successful in reducing the
volume of flows, lengthening their maturity, or both. We also examine
the evolution of other key macroeconomic variables around these
episodes. Along the way, we discuss the relative merits of such measures,
document and chronicle the timing and highly varied nature of the
measures that have been implemented, and review the recent literature
on the topic, with particular emphasis on a variety of case studies. The
main conclusions that emerge from the analytical exercise and from the
review of the country experiences can be summarized as follows.
First, in the context of a theoretical model, we show that a temporary
tax that increases the cost of borrowing abroad to domestic residents has
the intended effect of reducing net cross-border capital flows. It enables
the monetary authorities temporarily to keep domestic interest rates
above world levels, thus raising the "effective price" of consuming today
consuming at a future date, when the controls are no longer in
yplace. This induces households to postpone consumption; the temporary
'!decline in consumption, in turn, depreciates the real exchange rate and
~educes the current account deficit - fulfilling, at least in principle, the
pntentions of policy makers.
Second, we argue, as shown formally in Reinhart and Smith (1996),
Por instance, there is much debate within Chile and Colombia on the current usefulness
of the controls. See Lefort and Budnevich (1996), and Valdes-Prieto and Soto (1995).
See Reinhart (1996) for a comparison of the symmetric and asymmetric cases.
that the response to the policy change hinges importantly on the degree
of intertemporal substitution and less so on the duration that th~ co~tro~s
are in place. Formally, if the intertemporal elasticity of substItutIOn IS
low as has been found for a number of developing countries (see, for
inst~nce, Ostry and Reinhart, 1992, and Reinhart and Vegh, 1:95); then
our results imply that the tax on inflows would have to be qUIte hIgh to
have the desired macroeconomic effect. Indeed, this observation concurs
with the actual policies implemented by a number of countrie~; for
instance, Colombia's reserve requirement rate on offshore borrowmg of
a maturity of thirty days or less is 140 percent. .
Third, in light of the recent experiences of. co~ntrIes ~hat have
adopted measures designed to curb short-term capItal mflo,:"s,I~ap~ears
that at least in the short run, such policies were effectIve m eIther
red~cing the volume of capital inflows, affecting their composition, or
both, in a relatively brief period of time. Hence, it could be .a~gued that
if the capital inflows are perceived as temporary, such pohcles .can be
effective, especially because the reduction in the volum~ of net mflows
reduces potential future outflows and thus the economI~ costs ~f such
turbulence. This observation must be interpreted cautIOusly, m that
often the controls were part of a larger policy package aimed at re-
ducing capital inflows or lengthening their maturities. For example, the
introduction of controls often coincided with increased exchange rate
flexibility and the scaling back of sterilized interventi0.n .de~igned to
encourage a reduction in domestic interest rates. Hence, It ISdIfficult to
isolate the effects of the controls per se. .
Fourth most of the empirical work on the effectiveness of capItal
controls has tended to conclude that controls lose their effectiveness
relatively quickly. However, in most of this work no dis~inctio~s .are~ad.e
among the "types" of capital controls. Specifically, httle dIstmctIon IS
made between measures to discourage inflows and controls on ~utfloW~;
Indeed there may be reasons to believe that their "lack of effectIvenesS
, . ff·thanis not symmetric and that controls on mflows may be more e ective
controls on outflows. One reason to believe this is that controls ?~
outflows are usually resorted to during balance-of-payments or finanCIa
. d charac-crises. (East Asia provides recent examples.) These episo es are . h
terized by large devaluations of the exchange rate, steep de~lines ~n: ~
stock market, increased volatili~y' in ~nanci~~ variabl~s, a h~~er r:sco~_
default and in some cases pohtIcal mstabIhty. The ImpOSItIOn0 4", . t come.troIs in and of itself may send a "signal" that worse tImes are 0 _, , .,. t ates usu
In such circumstances, spreads of domestIc to foreIgn mteres r
ally reac~ level~ (particularly on a risk-adjusted basis) that provide a
powerful mcentlVe for outflows. In contrast, as the experiences of several
countries in the early 1990s shows, controls on inflows tend to emerge
under more "normal" economic circumstances. While rate-of-return
spreads may still provide an incentive to evade the controls, the rate of
return differentials tend to be smaller than those observed during crises
and hence the desire to circumvent the controls may not be as strong.
Fur.ther, .from the viewpoint of an international investor, one can always
redIrect mvestments to countries where there are less impediments.s
~he ~ext section discusses the conditions under which controlling
capItal mflows may be desirable and chronicles the recent use of
measures to curb capital inflows, while section 14.3 sketches the main
features of a theoretical model and discusses the implications of the
controls. Section 14.4 reviews for a range of countries the evolution and
composition of capital flows and other macroeconomic variables around
the periods when controls are introduced, while the last section discusses
policy implications and areas for future research.
14.2 Controlling capital inflows in the 1990s
It is widely agreed that free cross-border movement of capital is a first-
best solution in a world where markets function efficiently, prices are
fully flexible, and there are no distortions. The rationale for controlling
cross-border capital flows therefore usually stems from a variety of rea-
sons that have to do with the presence of distortions, rigidities, and/or
market failures (e.g., Tobin, 1978; see Dooley, 1996, for a recent review
?f the literature). The desire to maintain monetary policy independence
m the face of a fixed exchange rate - a rigidity that is the result of an
explicit policy - has also served as the motivation for introducing capital
contr~ls.6 At pre~ent, the possibility of a sudden reversal of capital in-
; flow~ISa key P?hcy co.ncern for the many developing countries that rely
heaVIly on foreIgn capItal to finance large current account deficits - and
th~se concerns have intensified in the wake of the Mexican and Asian
CrIses.Despite its policy relevance, however, there does not appear to be
~ c~nse.~sus (eithe~ in. acade~ic or po~icy circles) on the usefulness or
esrrabihty of curbmg mternatlOnal capItal movements by imposing vari-
ous. forms of capital controls and/or prudential regulations. In the re-
;lllamder of this section, we discuss what types of controls on inflows and
on outflows may potentially mitigate the disruptive effects of sharp and
5 This argument will, of course, not hold if everyone adopts uniform controls.
6 A recent example is Thailand. See Glick, Hutchison, and Moreno (1995).
that the response to the policy change hinges importantly on the degree
of intertemporal substitution and less so on the du~a~ion that th~ co~tro~s
are in place. Formally, if the intertemporal eiastlcity of substltutIOn IS
low as has been found for a number of developing countries (see, for
inst~nce, Ostry and Reinhart, 1992, and Reinhart and V6gh, 1?95): then
our results imply that the tax on inflows would have to be qUIte hIgh to
have the desired macroeconomic effect. Indeed, this observation concurs
with the actual policies implemented by a number of countrie~; for
instance, Colombia's reserve requirement rate on offshore borrowmg of
a maturity of thirty days or less is 140 percent.
Third, in light of the recent experiences of co~ntries ~hat have
adopted measures designed to curb short-term capitalmflo,:s, I~ap~ears
that at least in the short run, such policies were effectlve m eIther
red~cing the volume of capital inflows, affecting their composition, or
both, in a relatively brief period of time. Hence, it could be .a~gued that
if the capital inflows are perceived as temporary, such polICIes ~an be
effective, especially because the reduction in the volum~ of net mflows
reduces potential future outflows and thus the economI~ costs ~f such
turbulence. This observation must be interpreted cautIOusly, m that
often the controls were part of a larger policy package aimed at re-
ducing capital inflows or lengthening their maturities. For example, the
introduction of controls often coincided with increased exchange rate
flexibility and the scaling back of sterilized interventio.n .de~igned to
encourage a reduction in domestic interest rates. Hence, It ISdIfficult to
isolate the effects of the controls per se. .
Fourth most of the empirical work on the effectiveness of capItal
controls has tended to conclude that controls lose their effectiveness
relatively quickly. However, in most of this work no dis~inctio?s .are~ad.e
among the "types" of capital controls. Specifically, lIttle dIstmctIOn IS
made between measures to discourage inflows and controls on ~utflow~;
Indeed there may be reasons to believe that their "lack of effectlveness
, . ff . thanis not symmetric and that controls on mflows may be more e ectlve
controls on outflows. One reason to believe this is that controls ?~
outflows are usually resorted to during balance-of-payments or financia
. d charac-crises. (East Asia provides recent examples.) These episo es are . h
terized by large devaluations of the exchange rate, steep de~lines ~n: ~
stock market, increased volatility in financial variables, a h~~her ns 0_
default and in some cases political instability. The impOSItIOnof co
n
4", . t come.troIs in and of itself may send a "signal" that worse tlmes are 0 _, , .' . t t rates USUIn such circumstances, spreads of domestlc to foreIgn III eres
ally reac~ level~ (particularly on a risk-adjusted basis) that provide a
powerfulmcentlve for outflows. In contrast, as the experiences of several
countries in the early 1990s shows, controls on inflows tend to emerge
under more "normal" economic circumstances. While rate-of-return
spreads may still provide an incentive to evade the controls, the rate of
return differentials tend to be smaller than those observed during crises
and hence the desire to circumvent the controls may not be as strong.
Fur.ther, .from the viewpoint of an international investor, one can always
redIrect mvestments to countries where there are less impediments.s
~he ~ext section discusses the conditions under which controlling
capItal mflows may be desirable and chronicles the recent use of
measures to curb capital inflows, while section 14.3 sketches the main
features of a theoretical model and discusses the implications of the
controls. Section 14.4 reviews for a range of countries the evolution and
composition of capital flows and other macroeconomic variables around
the periods when controls are introduced, while the last section discusses
policy implications and areas for future research.
14.2 ControlJingcapital inflows in the 1990s
It is widely agreed that free cross-border movement of capital is a first-
best solution in a world where markets function efficiently, prices are
fully flexible, and there are no distortions. The rationale for controlling
cross-border capital flows therefore usually stems from a variety of rea-
sons that have to do with the presence of distortions, rigidities, and/or
market failures (e.g., Tobin, 1978; see Dooley, 1996, for a recent review
?f the literature). The desire to maintain monetary policy independence
m the face of a fixed exchange rate - a rigidity that is the result of an
explicit policy - has also served as the motivation for introducing capital
controls.6 At present, the possibility of a sudden reversal of capital in-
flow~is a key policy concern for the many developing countries that rely
heavIly on foreign capital to finance large current account deficits - and
. concerns have intensified in the wake of the Mexican and Asian
cnses. Despite its policy relevance, however, there does not appear to be
a consensus (either in academic or policy circles) on the usefulness or
of curbing international capital movements by imposing vari-
forms of capital controls and/or prudential regulations. In the re-
of this section, we discuss what types of controls on inflows and
outflows may potentially mitigate the disruptive effects of sharp and
5 This argument will, of course, not hold if everyone adopts uniform controls.
6 A recent example is Thailand. See Glick, Hutchison, and Moreno (1995).
sudden reversals in international capital flows, reviews the various argu-
ments made as to their relative merits, and chronicles their incidence
during the 1990s.
14.2.1. Controlling capital inflows: The pros and cons
Although it is common to label certain types of controls or restrictions on
cross-border capital flows as either controls on inflows or outflows, many
types of controls are likely to influence both inflows. and outflows. ~or
example, a ban on the convertibility of the domestlc currency, WhICh
is intended to curtail outflows, is also likely to make the country less
attractive to foreign investors - thus reducing inflows. Similarly,
Bartolini and Drazen (1994) and Laban and Larrain (1994) argue. that a
liberalization of outflows increases foreign investor confidence m that
country and may result in higher net inflows. Keeping in mind this lin~
between capital inflows and outflows, it is useful to approach the analySIS
of alternative capital controls according to whether they are targeted
toward inflows or outflows.
Large-scale capital inflows could lead to an overheated economy, an
appreciated real exchange rate, and an uns~stainable cur~en~ a~count
deficit; large outflows could produce a receSSIOnand a declme m mvest-
ment which would tend to reduce the medium-term growth prospects.
Larg~ flows in either direction also tend to complicate t.he conduct of
monetary policy and, if there are distortions in the finanCial sector, may
increase the fragility of the domestic financial system. In the ~ase of
inflows, monetary and credit expansion may be greate: than deSIred by
the authorities, given their inflation objectives; maSSIve ?utflow.s.may
require sustained and prohibitively high interest rates, plac~ng addItiOnal
strains on the banking sector. Further, as the recent MeXIcan and E~st
Asian experiences vividly illustrate, the reversal of flows can be qUIte
abrupt, threatening the stability of the financial system. Hence,. one
possible way of simultaneously avoiding some of the problems assocIated
with large destabilizing inflows and even more problematic outflows
might be to limit inflows to begin with. ..' 0
In addition to this "precautionary" motive for restnctmg capItal lll-
flows several arguments have been advanced in favor of controls, par-
, . (Kmanticularly when the inflows are perceIved to be temporary see rug ,
1987). For instance, it has been argued that th~ te~pora~y r~al exchan;e
rate appreciation that often accompanies a nse m capItal mflows m oy
have adverse long-lived effects on exports - the so-called hysteresIS
. f' fl be war-argument. A second argument is that taxatIOn.o mows may
ranted if the capital inflows are purely speculatlve.
One proposal (see e.g., Eichengreen, Tobin, and Wyplosz, 1995) that
has recently gained some popularity is the worldwide implementation of
a tax on foreign exchange trading or on short-term cross-border bank
loans. Advocates contend that such a tax would give countries increased
domestic monetary policy autonomy, raise the costs of speculative
attacks on fixed exchange rate regimes, and encourage investors to focus
o? olonger~term investments rather than short-term speculative opportu-
mhes. rr:hISproposal is a modern vintage of James Tobin's proposal to
tax foreIgn exchange transactions in order to " throw sand in the wheels
of international finance." Although there are a number of proposals of
this sort that differ by the tax base or tax rate, they all aim to increase the
cost of establishing short positions in currencies and thus to make specu-
lators "pay" for their activities. As discussed later, some countries have
in fact implemented variants of these types of policies.
There are, however, a number of practical problems with a "Tobin
tax" that may significantly limit its appeal (see Garber and Taylor,
1995, and Dooley, 1996). First, to be effective, it would probably need
to be adopted worldwide and uniformly; if it were adopted by just the
major industrial countries, say, it would likely cause the taxed activities
to shift to untaxed countries. Second, penalizing cross-border bank loans
may not be very effective in restraining speculative activity if banks
do not engage in large position taking.7 Third, it is becoming increasingly
easy to create synthetic positions through derivatives markets, com-
plicating the effective taxation of "foreign exchange transactions."s
Fourth, taxing foreign exchange trading is likely to remove significant
liquidity from these markets. While the first of these may not be very
~elevant for developing countries where offshore foreign exchange trad-
mg may be limited or nonexistent, the remaining concerns are still a
factor.
A more general criticism of any type of capital control is provided by
the empirical finding that capital controls tend to lose their effectiveness
relatively quickly as individuals find ways of dodging the controls.9 Fur-
ther, recent research suggests that countries that have capital controls in
place often have higher inflation and lower real interest rates than other
countries.lO
7 ~he experience of Spain during the 1992 exchange rate mechanism (ERM) crisis high-
hghts the importance of this argument.
8 See Garber and Lall (Chapter 7) in this volume.
9 See Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez (1993) for a comprehensive review.
10 See Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995). One interpretation of this finding is that the
controls are Just another form of financial repression - the authorities can more effec-
tively tax "captive" domestic currency deposits through higher inflation.
14.2.2. Short-term versus long-term: Is there a difference?
Several countries currently seek to promote long-term capital inflows but
to discourage short-term inflows. The motivation for suc~ a policy is
presumably that long-term capital inflows take longer to wIthdraw from
a country so that the lower the share of short-~erm ~api:al in total flows,
the lower the probability of a sudden reversal m capItal mflows. Further,
it is argued that long-term flows, such as foreign direct investment, tend
to be more strongly guided by medium-term funda~ent~ls and ar~ less
sensitive than short-term flows to cyclical fluctuatIOns m domestIc or
international interest rates.l1
In addition to the potential reversibility of inflows, there may be other
reasons why the authorities may wish to limit short-term. flows. N~tabl~,
a surge in short-term inflows often shows up as, a rapId e:c~ansIO~III
short-maturity bank deposits; ifthe domestic bankmg se~t?r ~smefficlent
or poorly supervised, the authorities may wish to ~mlmlze. the role
played by banks in intermediating capital flows. In thIS case, It may be
preferable to have a larger share of flows routed through bond and
, k t 12eqmty mar e s. .'
The current practices of several developmg countn~s am?~nt to re-
stricting either the types of external financing of domestIc entItleS or else
the maturities of external financing. An example of the former approach
is restricting the foreign issuance of securities by domestic entities,
thereby encouraging direct investment instead. An exa~ple of ~he latter
policy would be to restrict, say via a tax, short-matunty foreIgn bond
issues or bank loans. ,
Just as there are practical problems associated with designing cap~tal
controls to target only inflows or only outflows, it is difficult to deSIgn
capital controls that distinguish between short-term and long-term
capital flows. Specifically, it is often not clear which capital flows are
short-term and which are long-term. Standard balance-of-payments
classifications - direct investment, portfolio flows, short-term flows, a,nd
.' 1 '1' ff ctIVethe like - are in general not very mformatIve as to the vo atIlty, e e
maturity, and liquidity of the flows. Indeed, as Claessens, Doole~, a~d
Warner (1995) suggest, the distinctiveness of these flows ~ay be sl~n~-
cantly less clear than these ~ategori~s s~g~es~..Fu~~her, It see~s l~i ~
that even if a set of controls ISeffectIve m hmltmg short-term for g
11 See Edwards (1991). . . ncyof
12 This argument is reinforced by the fact that most countries view stabilIty and so~ve 'ty
the banking system as a much more important consideration than weakness III equi
markets.
financi?g, if incentives are strong enough, even flows that are perceived
by pol~cy ~akers to be "long-term" flows may in fact be considerably
more. h~md. For example, selling direct investments may require time
and ,~lgll1ficant.t~ansactions costs: but it is possible to create a "synthetic
~a!~ by obtamm~ bank loans m the domestic currency that can be
11l1tIatedrather qmckly and with low transactions costs. In addition, to
the extent that equity and long-term bonds - and, to a much lesser
degree, term deposits and bank loans - have reasonably liquid secondary
mark~ts, asset sales by foreigners can be expected to require an adjust-
ment m the secondary market, rather than an adjustment in the primary
mark~t a.s is. the case when short-term flows dry up. Because large-
scale h~mdatlOn of ':long-term" securities (equity, long-term bonds) may
well spIllover to pnmary markets, it is not clear that this sort of policy
would be effective precisely at those times when it would be beneficial.
Inde~d.' the sell-off in late 1994 and early 1995 of emerging-markets
secuntI~s not only reduced securities prices, but it also sharply con-
~racted Iss~ance activity in primary securities markets by most develop-
mg countnes.
14.2.3 Taxing short-term flows in the 1990s: The measures
The preceding discussion suggests that one policy to reduce net inflows
directly is the taxation of gross inflows, possibly in the form of a tax that
~allsmore heavily on short-term inflows. The policies adopted by Chile
m 1991, Colombia in 1993, and Thailand in 1995-96 (see Tables 14.1 and
14.2) are recent examples of this type of policy. In these cases, a
nonremunerated reserve requirement is to be deposited at the central
bank on liabilities in foreign currency associated with direct borrowing
by firms. In the case of Colombia, the reserve requirement is to be
maintained for the duration of the loan and applies to all loans with a
maturity of five years or less, except for trade credit with a maturity of
four months or less. The percentage of the requirement declines as the
maturity lengthens; from 140 percent for funds that are thirty days or less
to 42.8 percent for five-year funds. For Chile, the tax is of the form of a
nonremunerated 30 percent reserve requirement to be deposited at the
centr~l bank for a period of one year on liabilities in foreign currency
assocIated with direct borrowing by firms. The tax rate for various
maturities is summarized in Table 14.3 and highlights how such a mea-
Sure ~~y act as a, disincentive to borrow abroad, particularly at short
~atuntIes - that IS, the tax is borne by the borrower. The table also
~lghlights how high the tax rates are at short maturities, possibly suggest-
mg that the authorities believed lower tax rates would not have been a
Indonesia (1990)
March 1991
Central Bank adopts measures to discourage offshore borrowing. Bank
Indonesia begins to scale down its swap operations by reducing individual
banks' limits from 25 to 20 percent of capital. The three-month swap
premium was raised by 5 percentage points.
October 1991
All state-related offshore commercial borrowing was made subject to prior
approval by the government and annual ceilings were set for new
commitments over the next five years.
November 1991
Further measures are taken to discourage offshore borrowing. The limits on
banks' net open-market foreign-exchange positions were tightened by
placing a separate limit on off-balance-sheet positions.
Bank Indonesia also announced that future swap operations (except for
"investment swaps" with maturities of more than two years) would be
undertaken only at the initiative of Bank Indonesia.
Malaysia (1989)
June 1, 1992
Limits on non-trade-related swap transactions were imposed on commercial
banks.
January 17, 1994-August 1994
Banks were subject to a ceiling on their non-trade- or non-investment-
related external liabilities.
January 24, 1994-August 1994
Residents were prohibited from selling short-term monetary instruments to
nonresidents.
February 2, 1994-August 1994 . .
Commercial banks were required to place with Bank Negara the nngglt
funds of foreign banking institutions (Vostro accounts) held in non-
interest-bearing accounts. However, in the January-May period these
accounts were considered part of the eligible liabilities base for the
calculation of required reserves, resulting in a negative effective interest
rate on Vostro balances.
February 23, 1994-August 1994 d
Commercial banks are not allowed to undertake non-trade-related swap an
outright forward transactions on the bid side with foreign customers.
Philippines (1992)
July 1994 .
Bangko Central begins to discourage forward cover arrangements WIth
nonresident financial institutions.
Thailand (1988)
January 1990
Banks and finance companies net foreign exchange positions may not
exceed 20 percent of capital.
Banks and finance companies net foreign liabilities may not exceed 20
percent of capital.
Residents are not allowed to hold foreign currency deposits except only for
trade-related purposes.
April 1990
Banks and finance companies net foreign-exchange positions limit raised to
25 percent of capital.
August 8, 1995
Reserve.requirements, to be held in the form of non-interest-bearing
depOSItsat the Bank of Thailand, on short-term nonresident baht
accoun~s were r.aised from 2 to 7 percent. While reserve requirements on
domestic depOSIts are also 7 percent, up to 5 percent can be held in the
form of interest-bearing public bonds.
December 1995
The 7 percent reserve requirement is extended to finance companies short-
term (less than one year) promissory notes held by nonresidents.
A .variety of measures aimed at reducing foreign-financed lending were
mtroduced.
April 19, 1996
Offshore borrowing with maturities of less than 1 year by commercial banks
finance com?~nies, and finance and security companies will be subject to ~
7 percent mllllmum reserve requirement in the form of a nonremunerated
deposit with the Bank of Thailand. Loans for trade purposes will be
exempt.
;;Vote:The date next to the country name denotes the first year of the surge in
mfiows.
Sources: Alfiler (1995), Bank Indonesia, Annual Report, various issues; Bank
Neg~ra, Annual Report, various issues; Bank of Thailand, Annual Report, vari-
ous Issues.
~uffic~e~t disincentive - an issue that will be taken up in the next section.
n pnnCIple, because of their breadth, these measures affect the house-
hold .sect?r, nonfinancial businesses, as well as the financial sector. In
practIce, It has mainly served as a deterrent for the banking system to
borrow offshore.
More recently, Brazil has implemented a variety of taxes and mea-
Table 14.2. Restrictions on inflows and prudential requirements:
Eastern Europe and Latin America
Brazil (1992)
October 1994 .. d
A 1percent tax on foreign investment in the stock market. Ehmmate on
March 10, 1995. . d f 3
The tax on Brazilian companies issuing bonds overseas was raIse rom to
7 percent of the total. Eliminated on March 10, 1995. . . .
The tax paid by foreigners on fixed-interest investments m BraZIl was raIsed
from 5 to 9 percent. Reduced back to 5 percent on March 10, 1995.
The Central Bank raised limits on the amount of dollars that can be bought
on foreign exchange markets.
Chile (1990)
June 1991 . d h
Nonremunerated 20 percent reserve requirement to be depo~lte at t e
Central Bank for a period of one year on liabilities in foreIgn currency for
direct borrowing by firms. .
The stamp tax of 1.2 percent a year (previously paid by. dome~tIc currency
credits only) was applied to foreign loans as ~ell. ThIs req~1fement
applies to all credits during their first year, wIth the exceptIon of trade
loans.
May 1992 .
The reserve requirement on liabilities in foreign currency fo~ dIrect
borrowing by firms is raised to 30 percent. Hence, all foreIgn currency
liabilities have a common reserve requirement.
Colombia (1991)
June 1991 . f sonal
A 3 percent withholding tax on foreign exchange receIpts rom per. d
services rendered abroad and other transfers, which could be c1aIme as
credit against income tax liability.
February 1992 .... h rchases of
Banco de la Republica increases ItScommISSIon on ItS cas pu
foreign exchange from 1.5 to 5 percent.
June 1992 t f ervices
Regulation of the entry of foreign currency as paymen or s .
September 1993 . d sited at the
A nonremunerated 47 percent reserve reqUIrement to.be epo . by
Central Bank on liabilities in fo~eign curre~cy ~or dlrecth~o~~~::~~ of the
firms The reserve requirement ISto be mamtamed for t
h
I except
loan ~nd applies to all loans with a maturity of 18 mont s or ess,
for trade credit.
August 1994
Nonremunerated reserve requirement to be deposited at the Central Bank
on liabilities in foreign currency for direct borrowing by firms. The
reserve requirement is to be maintained for the duration of the loan and
applies to all loans with a maturity of five years or less, except for trade
credit with a maturity of four months or less. The percentage of the
requirement declines as the maturity lengthens, from 140 percent for
funds that are 30 days or less to 42.8 percent for five-year funds.
Czech Republic (1992)
April 1995
The central bank introduced a fee of 0.25 percent on its foreign exchange
transactions with banks, with the aim of discouraging short-term
speculative flows.
August 1, 1995
A limit on net short-term (less than one year) foreign borrowing by banks is
introduced.
Each bank is to ensure that its net short-term liabilities to nonresidents, in
all currencies, do not exceed the smaller of 30 percent of claims on
nonresidents or Kc 500 million.
Administrative approval procedures seek to slow down short-term
borrowing by nonbanks.
Mexico (1990)
April 1992
A regulation that limited foreign currency liabilities of commercial banks to
10 percent of their total loan portfolio was passed. Banks had to place 15
percent of these liabilities in highly liquid instruments.
Note: The date next to the country name denotes the first year of the surge in
inflows.
Sources: Annual reports of Banco Central de Chile (1991 and 1992), Banco de la
Republica, Colombia (1993 and 1994), Banco de Mexico (1992), and Conselho
Monetario Nacional, Brasil (1994 and 1995).
sures on inflows (Table 14.2),with greater variation across assets as well
as across maturities.13 As in the cases of Chile and Colombia, the tax on
foreign issuance of bonds falls on the borrower. However, some other
taxes are paid by foreign lenders. Notably, foreigners investing in the
13 As capital inflows shrank in the wake of the Mexican crisis, Brazil eased or eliminated
some restrictions on inflows in March 1995.For a detailed summary of all the measures
taken since 1993, see Garcia and Barcinski (1996).
Table 14.3. Tax rate on short-term capital inflows
according to maturity (in percent)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
48
60
95
90
74
67
61
55
50
45
41
37
33
30
27
25
22
20
18
16
15
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
7
6
5
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
1
o
140
137
135
132
129
127
123
122
119
117
115
112
110
108
106
104
102
100
98
96
94
92
90
88
86
85
83
80
78
77
75
73
74
72
71
69
56
43
Sources: Banco de Chile, Annual Report (1992) a~d
Banco de la Repliblica, Annual Report, Colombia
(1994).
stock market have to pay a 1percent tax up front.14 Hence the tax falls
more heavily on active investors who trade more often and hold
equity for only relatively short periods of time, but falls less heavily on
more passive "buy and hold" investors. Hence, these measures are de-
signed to target the speculative, "hot money" variety of capital inflows.
The tax to be paid by foreigners on fixed-income investments has similar
characteristics.
The main disadvantage with these measures is that flows are likely to
be rerouted through other channels - for example, the over- or
underinvoicing of imports and exports so long as trade credits are ex-
empt from the tax (see Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez, 1993). Laban and
Larrafn (1994) have argued that, in the case of Chile, overinvoicing of
imports is not likely to be an attractive alternative since imports are
taxed at a comparable rate.15 Indeed, as discussed in detail later, inflows
to Chile in 1991 were below those observed in 1990, possibly attesting to
the success of this policy. While net inflows increased, once again, in 1992
and subsequently, the increases came primarily in foreign direct invest-
ment and other long-term flows. A similar pattern emerges in Colombia
during 1994, with short-term flows accounting for a declining share of
total f1oWS.16
In other instances, capital controls have been quantitative in nature
(Tables 14.1 and 14.2). Measures implemented have included prudential
limits, or prohibition, on non-trade-related swap activities, offshore
borrowing, banks' net foreign exchange positions (Czech Republic, In-
donesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand), caps on banks' foreign cur-
rency liabilities (Mexico), and even blanket measures that prohibited
domestic residents from selling short-term money market instruments to
foreigners (Malaysia).
In the case of Malaysia, wide domestic-foreign interest rate differen-
tials in tandem with widespread expectation of an appreciation of the
ringgit during the late 1993 led to a surge in short-term capital inflows,
which culminated with the imposition of six measures to restrict inflows
in January 1994 (Table 14.1). The inflows came in the form of a marked
rise in short-term bank deposits, which were seen by policy makers as
speculative in nature.17 Consequently, most of the measures were
14 This was eliminated on March 10, 1995,in order to encourage inflowsin the wake of the
Mexican crisis.
15 However, some circumvention of the tax is effected by reclassifying loans as trade-
related.
16 However, total inflows to Colombia continued to increase in 1994.
17 See Aziz (1995).
directed toward the control of the activities of financial sector partici-
pants and most were announced to be temporary.18 The most successful
measure in reducing short-term inflows was apparently the measure that
prohibited domestic residents from selling short-term money market
instruments to foreigners; as the certificates of deposits (CDs) matured
and could not be rolled over, short-term inflows (and the monetary
aggregates) began to shrink. However, if such policies are maintained
indefinitely they will likely reduce the competitiveness and retard the
development of the financial sector.19 As far as a foreign investor is
concerned, the cost of this particular measure would be the forgone
return from not being able to roll over CDs. In practice, this opportunity
cost does not appear substantial since in 1994 Malaysian short-term
interest rates were close to world levels.
In April 1992, Mexico passed a regulation that limited foreign cur-
rency liabilities of commercial banks to 10 percent of their total loan
portfolio. However, it is not clear to what extent this measure acted to
reduce the size of the capital inflows, since banks' total loan portfolios
had been expanding rapidly throughout that period and the initial share
of loans in foreign currency was below the 10 percent limit. For example,
during 1992 bank assets grew by 41 percent while foreign currency loans
grew by 88 percent; a similar pattern emerges in 1993, with foreign
currency loans increasing by 50 percent while total loans rose by 25
percent. Indeed, the constraint only appears to have become binding in
1994 when total and foreign currency loans both rose by 27 percent.
The model we study is a standard, infinite horizon, representative agent
cash-in-advance model with two goods - a traded good and a nontraded
good. Reinhart and Smith (1996) study this model in detail, and thus
in what follows we only briefly review the model and illustrate a few of
its key qualitative predictions. The "home country" is a small open
economy facing a constant world real interest rate of r > 0 each period.
The representative agent in the home country has preferences:
where Ct and Ct denote consumption of the non traded and traded goods
respectively, f3= r is the subjective discount rate, and U( Ct, Ct) is strictly
18 Only two measures (of the original six) remained in place.
19 Malaysia removed most capital controls during the second half of 1994.
concave, increasing in each of its arguments, and is twice continuously
differentiable.
There is free trade in goods, and the world price of the traded good in
units of foreign currency is constant and is denoted P*. The home coun-
try currency price of the nontraded good is denoted P"~and the home
country currency price of a unit of foreign currency is denoted Et• The
real exchange rate is therefore et = E,P*IPt• We assume that the nominal
exchange rate depreciates at rate E :2: O.
There are three assets available to home country residents: the do-
mestic currency (which is not held by foreigners); foreign bonds, which
yield an instantaneous return of 1+ r per unit invested, expressed in units
of the traded good; and one-period bonds issued by home country enti-
ties, which yield an instantaneous return of 1+ Pt per unit invested (also
in terms of the traded good).
The representative agent in the home country receives an endowment
of non traded and traded goods each period equal to y and y* respec-
tively. Let at == mt - bt denote the representative agent's real wealth at t,
where mt is real cash balances and bt is the level of indebtedness. The
budget constraint is therefore:
Here, rt is lump-sum transfers from the government. The appropriate
interest rate in formulating this budget constraint is the domestic real
rate Pt because we are interested only in restrictions on capital inflows,
and thus Pt :2: r.
Money is valued in this economy because it is useful for making
transactions. Formally, the representative agent's consumption pur-
chases must satisfy a cash-in-advance constraint:
mt:2: a(c; +Ct/et),
where a is a pOSItIve constant. It is well known that expression (3)
holds as an equality if the nominal interest rate is positive; our
assumptions on the rate of depreciation of the nominal exchange rate
(E :2: 0) and the positive world real interest rate will ensure this is always
true.
To motivate our study of taxes on capital inflows, it is convenient to
assume that the representative agent has an initial level of indebtedness:
bo> O. For simplicity, let bo = mo so that ao = O. With these assumptions,
the budget constraint can be written:
Home country residents therefore seek to maximize (1) subject to
(4).
The consolidated budget constraint of the government-central bank
in the home country is:
Here, f, is foreign exchange reserves (foreign bonds), and the final term
on the right side is the revenues from taxing capital inflows, I,. If there are
outflows of capital, then I, = O. It simplifies the exposition to assume that
the tax base is the net interest payments: an interest payment to a
foreigner of p,!, causes the foreigner to incur a tax liability of y,p,!" where
y, E [0, 1]. The choice of tax base is of no material consequence for the
results. Our focus is on situations in which these taxes are only tempo-
rary - they are levied during the interval of time [0, T) for T;;::: O. We
assume that f,= 0 \::j t, and thus net revenue from seigniorage and from
taxing capital inflows is rebated lump-sum to residents in the home
country.
Note that in equilibrium p, = rl(l - y) so long as inflows are positive,
I, = b, > o. This is true because a foreign investor receives a net return
of (1 - y,)p, per unit invested in home country bonds, and thus if
foreign investors are going to want to purchase home country bonds,
these bonds would have to offer a rate of return that is at least as
attractive as the return on foreign bonds: p, = rI(l - y,) so long as b, > o.
It is possible that, at some date, b,< 0, and thus there are capital outflows.
In that case, taxes on inflows have no effect on domestic interest rates,
and p, = r.
The equilibrium conditions for the nontraded goods market, the
money market, and the traded goods sector respectively are:
In the case of free capital mobility and no taxes on inflows we have
p, = r, \::j t. Thus, if q; denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint,
the first-order conditions associated with optimal consumption of traded
and nontraded goods respectively are:
Uc,(c"C~) = q;(1 + ai,),
Uc.(c"C~) = _q;(_1 +_al_o,).
, c,
Equilibrium consumption of non traded and traded goods are therefo~e
C, = y and C!= y* - rbo. Finally, the equilibrium real exchange rate IS
constant and equal to:
_ Uc,*(y,y* -rbo)
c, - ( ).Uc, y, y* -rbo
14.3.1 Taxing capital inflows
The first-order conditions for the representative agent in the home
country when there are controls on capital inflows are:
Uc,* (c"c7) = exp(- f:(ps - t3)dS) q;(1+ ai,), (13)
Uc,(c"c7) = exp( -f:(ps - t3)ds )q;(1 +ai,)/c" (14)
where q; is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint. For exposi-
tion purposes we assume that y, = yfor all t E [O,T). Suppose that the
domestic interest rate is bid up to its maximum possible equilibrium
value at t = 0, Po = rI(l - '/1, and that at this interest rate bo > O.z° It
follows that the domestic interest rate will also be bid up to this level at
all future dates prior to the removal of capital controls so long as b, > 0
at each date. Let t* > T denote a future date for which b, > 0 for all t < t*.
Thus, p, = rI(l - y) for all t < t*. It follows that, for all 0 ~ t < t*, we
can write:
Hence, the marginal utility of consumption of traded goods is declining
over the interval (0, t*), and thus the consumption of traded goods is
increasing over this time interval. But note that at date t = 0, the level
of consumption jumps downward to accommodate a jump in saving, so
this increasing rate of consumption over the time interval (0, t*) begins
from a lower initial level of consumption. The real exchange rate,
et = Uc;(y, en/uct(y, q), must also depreciate initially and then sub-
sequently appreciate over the interval (0, t*).
At t = 0, the imposition of controls on capital inflows causes the real
and the nominal interest rate to jump immediately upward in order to
either attract foreign capital or to entice residents to substitute out of
current consumption and therefore finance domestic credit needs. After
this initial impact effect, the real interest rate remains higher than the
world interest rate because the home country still must attract foreign
capital, but the higher interest rate continues to encourage saving in the
home country. The higher real interest rate is therefore encouraging
residents to substitute consumption intertemporally, which explains the
upward slowing consumption path. However, if at some date t* domestic
savings satisfy bt = 0, then foreign capital is not required to finance
domestic consumption and thus the real interest rate would fall to Pt = r
after this point is reached. Of course, if capital controls are removed
before bt is reduced to zero, then the real interest rate would fall to r at
date T as foreign capital could finance the amount bT > 0 at the world real
interest rate. In either case, the level of consumption after t* or T
(whichever comes first) is permanently higher than before the capital
controls were imposed because the tax liability associated with the public
debt is lower. Consequently, the imposition of a tax on capital inflows
initially causes a real exchange rate depreciation, and then the real
exchange rate appreciates to a level above its level before the tax was
imposed.
Taxes on capital inflows are often implemented with the aim of chang-
ing the maturity of composition of capital inflows. In particular, levying
taxes on short-term capital inflows are often implemented with the inten-
tion of lengthening the maturity composition of inflows. In our simple
model without capital flow restrictions, different maturities are perfect
substitutes to investors because there is a perfectly liquid secondary
market and there is no uncertainty. Thus, if we assumed that outstanding
debt could be refinanced costlessly in different maturities, then any ta.x
on short-term capital inflows would have no important effect in thIS
model other than to shift the maturity composition of debt, as foreigners
would undercut higher short-term interest rates by offering to lend funds
long-term at lower per-period rates.
14.4 Some stylized facts
Many case studies have recently examined the role played by capital
controls in managing the surge in capital inflows during the early 1990s.21
However, there has been little effort to systematically examine the "styl-
ized facts" before and after the controls are introduced for those coun-
tries implementing these measures. In this section we consider five
episodes in which capital controls on inflows were introduced during the
1990s: Chile (June 1991), Colombia (September 1993), Malaysia
(January 1994), Brazil (October 1994), and the Czech Republic (August
1995). Although, as shown in Tables 14.1 and 14.2, other countries have
adopted numerous "prudential" measures, these five constitute the ma-
jor and most unambiguous cases of the use of capital controls to curb
short-term inflows. Thailand's measures in late 1995 and early 1996 are
another important case, but the recentness of many of the stiffer mea-
sures makes it difficult to obtain sufficient data to analyze the conse-
quences of the controls. However, events in 1997 in Thailand highlight
that the controls were not successful in preventing a Mexico-style cur-
rency and banking crisis.
In what follows, we examine the evolution of the capital account and
its composition as well as the behavior of key macroeconomic variables,
which, as shown in the previous section, should be influenced by the
controls. Of course, any assessment of the impact of the capital account
measures has to be tempered by the fact that we do not observe the
counterfactual- that is, what capital flows and the macroeconomic envi-
ronment would have been in the absence of the controls.
14.4.1 The volume and composition of capital flows
Table 14.4 summarizes capital account developments around the time
capital controls are introduced (denoted in the table by t). We can make
the following observations based on these recent experiences with poli-
cies directed toward curbing short-term capital inflows.
First, reviewing the Chilean and Malaysian experiences (and, to a
lesser extent, the Czech case) at least in the short run, these distinctly
different policies were successful in reducing the volume of inflows in a
relatively brief period of time. Indeed, in the case of Chile and Malaysia
the capital account surpluses (as a percent of GDP) shrank by 7.6 and
21 For a comparison of Chile and Colombia, see Lefort and Budnevich (1996); Laban and
Larrafn (1994) examine the Chilean experience; and Garcia and Barcinski (1996) de-
scribe the Brazilian experience.
t+ 1 t + 2
4.7 n.a.
6.8 6.1
4.4 5.5
14.2 n.a.
7.9 n.a.
0.4 n.a.
0.8 0.8
2.2 2.7
2.9 n.a.
4.7 n.a.
1.3 n.a.
3.8 1.6
0.7 0.3
1.7 n.a.
-0.7 n.a.
12.6 n.a.
2.1 0.5
0.2 0.4
-1.3 n.a.
-1.6 n.a.
2.1 n.a.
0.8 1.8
15.1 percentage points, respectively, in the year the controls were intro-
duced. In the case of the Czech Republic, the decline in inflows was more
modest (3.5 percent) and was not apparent until 1996 (t + 1), as the
inflows were introduced in the latter half of 1995. No decline in the
volume of flows is apparent in the Colombian and Brazilian cases.
Second, it could be argued that the effect these policies had on the
composition of flows was the "desired" effect of lengthening maturities
in the cases of Chile, Colombia, and Malaysia, where a marked decline in
capital inflows occurred at the short maturities. As the third panel of
Table 14.4 highlights, in these three cases the decline in inflows was
concentrated in the short-term maturities that were targeted by the
measures. Brazilian measures, on the other hand, primarily targeted
portfolio flows - and, as Garcia and Barcinski (1996) argue, these do not
appear to have much success in reducing these inflows (see bottom panel
of Table 14.4).
Third, in four of the five cases (Brazil is the exception) reserve accu-
mulation slowed following the introduction of the measures, suggesting
that either the pressures to intervene in the foreign exchange market had
diminished (as inflows eased); the central banks had opted to allow the
exchange rate to adjust more freely, so as to reduce the scope of costly
sterilized intervention policies (an issue that will be discussed later); or a
combination of these developments.
Fourth, if the inflows are largely seen as a temporary phenomenon,
such policies appear to be quite effective (as least when complemented
by a reenforcing monetary policy stance, an issue to be discussed).
However, it is not possible from these experiences to draw any infer-
ence about the usefulness of the controls if the inflows persist over
longer periods of time or if the policies remain in place indefinitely. In
Malaysia the controls were subsequently removed, while in the case of
Colombia these measures have been eased; in the case of Chile there is
much debate over whether the reserve requirement and other measures
have become less binding; and in the cases of the Czech Republic
and Thailand the measures are recent. Lastly, in the Brazilian case it
appears that the measures were not particularly effective, even in the
short run.
Capital account balance (as % of GDP)
Brazil (August 1994) 2.4 2.5
Chile (June 1991) 10.0 2.4
Colombia (September 1993) 0.3 4.7
CzechRepublic (August 1995) 6.6 16.7
Malaysia (January 1994) 17.2 2.1
Direct investment (as % of GDP)
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
CzechRepublic
Malaysia
-0.1
0.8
1.4
2.1
5.2
Short-term capital flows (as % of GDP)
Brazil 0.2 -0.1
Chile 3.2 -0.7
Colombia 0.6 1.1
CzechRepublic 0.1 0.7
Malaysia 8.6 -4.6
Change in international reserves (in billions of US$)
Brazil 8.1 6.5
Chile 2.4 1.0
Colombia 1.4 0.7
CzechRepublic 2.4 7.7
Malaysia 10.0 -1.8
Portfolio flows (as % of GDP)
Brazil
Chile
Notes: t - 1 refers to the year before the capital controls are introduced. The
dates in parentheses indicatewhenthe controlswere introduced. SeeTables 14.1
and 14.2for details on the measures.An n.a. denotes the pertinent data were not
yet available.
Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, various
issues.
14.4.2 Monetary policy and capital controls
Besides a desire to affect capital flows, a motivation for introducing
controls is that it permits the central bank (at least in the short run) a
greater degree of monetary policy independence, even with a relatively
rigid exchange rate regime (see Laban and Larrafn, 1994). Hence, in
Real ex-post lending interest rates (% per annum)
Brazil (August 1994) 7.1
Chile (June 1991) 22.0
Colombia (September 1993) 8.1
CzechRepublic (August 1995) 3.0
Malaysia (January 1994) 8.0
Money and quasi money (% change, period end)
Brazil 2,652.0 1,081.8
Chile 23.6 28.1
Colombia 37.4 30.8
CzechRepublic 20.4 29.3
Malaysia 26.6 12.7
Nominal exchange rate (% change, period end)
Brazil
Chile 13.4
Colombia 14.8
CzechRepublic -6.5
Malaysia 3.4
26.0
10.6
13.5
4.4
2.0
10.6
11.0
17.9
21.1
11.2
10.7
3.7
2.6
43.4
23.3
33.3
6.2
19.9
n.a.
23.4
27.6
n.a.
12.1
21.4
2.0
-11.3
3.8
-0.7
11.1
13.0
-5.2
-5.3
Notes: t - 1 refers to the year before the capital controls are introduced. The
dates in parentheses indicatewhen the controlswere introduced. SeeTables14.1
and 14.2for details on the measures.An n.a. denotes the pertinent data werenot
yet available. .
Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, vanoUS
issues.
examining the effectiveness of the capital controls it is important to
assess what the course of monetary policy was during that period.
As the top panel of Table 14.5 highlights, an important determinant of
the relative success of the capital account measures appears to be the
stance adopted by monetary policy at the time of the introductio~ of
controls, and in the period immediately following their introductIOn.
Specifically, in the most "successful" cases (Chile and Malaysia), aggres-
sive sterilized intervention policies were abandoned when the controlS
were introduced allowing domestic nominal and real interest rates to fall
sharply (see Rei~hart and Dunaway, 1995). The decline in domestic rates
of return further reduced the attractiveness of domestic financial assets
and reinforced the aims of the capital controls. In the two intermediate
cases (Colombia and the Czech Republic), where the decline in inflows
were either more modest, or the only effects were to alter the composi-
tion of flows, monetary policy remained relatively neutral and real inter-
est rates rose modestly (as suggested by the theoretical model outlined in
the previous section). Note also that the slowing of reserve accumulation
in these countries may also have tempered the rise in interest rates by
reducing the impact of the controls on capital flows. However, in the case
of Brazil - where capital account measures appear to be least successful
in either discouraging inflows or altering their composition - a dramatic
tightening in monetary policy accompanied the controls. Aggressive
sterilization through open-market operations led to a substantial build-
up of domestic debt (see Garcia and Barcinski, 1996), and marked in-
creases in reserve requirements (see Reinhart and Reinhart, 1995) drove
the lending rate substantially higher. The outcome of these policies
was reflected in a sharp increase in real interest rates, which still
remain above 20 percent (see Table 14.5). In turn, the high real interest
rates have fostered capital inflows, as rates of return remain quite attrac-
tive by international standards, even on an after-tax basis. In effect, as
shown in Table 14.4, the surge in inflows was led by portfolio investments
- a large share of which was funneled into the domestic fixed-income
market.
With regard to monetary growth, despite an easing in monetary policy
in Chile and Malaysia and neutral policies in Colombia and the Czech
Republic, the tendency in the growth rates of the monetary aggregates
following the introduction of controls appears to be toward a decelera-
tion (Table 14.5). The tendency toward slower monetary growth does
not, however, appear to be a product of a weaker demand for money due
to lower economic activity (discussed later). Instead, it appears to reflect
either a slowdown in nonresident banking sector deposits (most notably
in Malaysia), less offshore borrowing by domestic banks (Chile and
Colombia), or a slowing in foreign exchange reserve accumulation by the
central bank. In any case, it has usually been part of the objective of the
central banks for either prudential reasons (i.e., concerns about an
unstable deposit base fueling a boom in bank lending) or for
macroeconomic reasons (e.g., limiting inflationary pressures).
14.4.3 Capital controls and selected macroeconomic indicators
As noted earlier, examining the links between capital controls and
macroeconomic developments is complicated by the lack of information
on how the economy would have fared in the absence of controls. How-
ever, a perusal of the indicators presented in Table 14.6 does not high-
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Table 14.6. Selected macroeconomic indicators
t-1 t + 1 t+ 2
Current account balance (as % of GDP)
-2.7Brazil (August 1994) -0.2 -0.3 n.a.
Chile (June 1991) -1.8 0.3
-1.6 -4.6
Colombia (September 1993) 1.8 -3.8 -4.5 -5.3
CzechRepublic (August 1995) -0.1 -4.2 -4.5 n.a.
Malaysia (January 1994) -4.6 -5.9 -8.5 n.a.
Real GDP (% change)
5.8 4.2 n.a.Brazil 4.2
Chile 3.3 7.3
11.0 6.3
Colombia 4.0 5.2 5.7 5.3
CzechRepublic 2.6 4.8 5.2 n.a.
Malaysia 8.3 9.2 9.6 n.a.
Real consumer spending (% change)
8.2 8.6 n.a.Brazil 5.9
Chile 0.4 8.9
11.6 8.1
Colombia -0.1 5.2 5.6
3.0
CzechRepublic 5.4 6.0 6.6 n.a.
Malaysia 5.3 7.0
13.7 n.a.
Real exchange rate (% change)
11.9 34.1 n.a. n.a.Brazil
-2.6 5.4 10.7 -2.1Chile 5.1 11.9 1.1Colombia 9.1
CzechRepublic n.a. n.a. n.a.
n.a.
-0.4 -3.2 0.4 n.a.Malaysia
. d d TheNotes: t - 1 refers to the year before the capital controls are ~ntro uce . See
dates in parentheses denote when the major controls were mtroduced..
Tables 14.1 and 14.2 for details on the measures.An n.a. denotes the pertment
data were not yet available.
Fund, World Economic Outlook, variousSources: International Monetary
issues.
. f f th 'tal controls onlight any substantive countercyclIcal ef ects 0 e capl . h
many key macroeconomic indicators. Indeed, it is hard to detect III t t:
data the temporary contraction in consumption, the .real exchange r:he
depreciation, and the narrowing curren~ account defiCItpostulated byally
theoretical model of the previous sectIOn. The current account usu
continued to deteriorate, as consumption and real GDP growth contin-
ued to expand briskly. This observation confirms that the reduced capital
account surplus is, at least initially, associated with a slowing in central
bank reserve accumulation and not a swift shift in trade in goods and
services. As to the real exchange rate, the picture is mixed. In some
countries the introduction of controls was followed by a period of mod-
erating real exchange rate appreciations (or a depreciation) while in
others the tendency to appreciate remained unabated.
The insensitivity of consumption, the real exchange rate, and the
current account surplus in the face of controls on capital inflows should
not be particularly surprising for the following reason. Specifically, the
weak response of these variables is precisely the prediction of the theo-
retical model already studied when the intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution in consumption is small. Ostry and Reinhart (1992) and Reinhart
and Vegh (1995) find that these elasticities are indeed very low for
developing countries. Reinhart and Smith (1996) use the model sketched
previously to show that for reasonable elasticities of substitution, signifi-
cant responses in consumption, the current account, and the real ex-
change rate would require enormous changes in real interest rates
induced by very high tax rates on capital inflows. Moreover, many coun-
tries appear to have used official reserves to buffer the impact of the
controls and this would further weaken the link between controls and
these macroeconomic variables.
14.5 Conclusion
In light of the recent experiences of countries that have adopted mea-
sures designed to curb short-term capital inflows, it appears that, at least
in the short run, such policies are effective in either reducing the volume
of capital inflows, affecting their composition, or both, in a relatively
brief period of time. Hence, it could be argued that if the capital inflows
are perceived as temporary, such policies could be effective, although
the evidence reviewed here suggests those measures may be more effec-
tive in shaping the composition of flows than in reducing their overall
volume. This is especially true insofar as by reducing the volume of net
inflows they reduce potential future outflows and the economic costs of
such turbulence. Of course, the longer the inflows persist or the longer
the policies remain in place, the greater the chances that the controls
become ineffective.
Most of the empirical work on the effectiveness of capital controls has
tended to conclude that controls lose their effectiveness relatively
quickly. However, in most of this work no distinctions are made among
the "types" of capital controls. Specifically, little distinction is made
between measures to discourage inflows and controls on outflows. In-
deed, there may be reasons to believe that their "lack of effectiveness" is
not symmetric and that controls on inflows may be more effective than
controls on outflows. Such differences may have little to do with the
design of the measures per se and have more to do with incentives to
circumvent the controls.
Controls on outflows are usually resorted to during balance-of-
payments or financial crises. These episodes are characterized by large
devaluations of the exchange rate, steep declines in the stock market,
increased volatility in financial variables, a higher risk of default, and, in
some cases, political instability. The imposition of controls, in and of
itself, may send a "signal" that worse times are to come. In such circum-
stances, domestic-foreign interest rate spreads usually reach levels (par-
ticularly on a risk-adjusted basis) that provide a powerful incentive to
evade the controls. In contrast, as the experiences of several countries in
the early 1990s show, controls on inflows tend to emerge under more
"normal" economic circumstances. While rate-of-return spreads may
still provide an incentive to evade the controls, the rate-of-return differ-
entials tend to be smaller than those observed during crises, and hence
the desire to circumvent them may not be as great. Moreover, from the
viewpoint of an international investor, one can always redirect invest-
ments to countries where there are fewer impediments.
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